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ARGUMENT I
WIFE ARGUES THAT THE "COURT ERRED IN ITS FINDINGS OF
FACT" BUT DOES NOT ENUMERATE WHICH FINDINGS AND
DOES NOT MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE. THUS, THIS COURT
SHOULD REFUSE TO CONSIDER THE MERITS OF THE
ARGUMENTS AND ACCEPT THE FINDINGS AS VALID
RESPONSE
Husband argues that Wife, in her brief in Argument I,
referenced that the Findings of Fact were in err, and although
Wife referenced that the Findings would be alluded to in
individual argument relating to alimony, attorney's fees, and
separate property issues, that they never were.

In fact, they

were, albeit perhaps not in the fashion desired by the Husband.
The Findings of Fact are found annexed to Wife's brief,
in the Addendum.

They are in err as they failed to (1)award

Petitioner alimony, (2) in not finding certain property to be
non-marital and (3) in failing to award attorney's fees.
FINDINGS OF FACT:
1. Alimony.

Paragraph 9 states the following, with respect

to alimony:
(A) The Court finds that Petitioner has not
received any testimony from any medical doctor that the
Petitioner is disabled to the point where she cannot become
employed and can contribute to her own earnings.
(B) The Court finds that the Petitioner's current
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receipt of disability from a private insurance carrier does not
convince the Court that her subsequent employment would disallow
her receipt of disability from that private insurance police
under the laws of the State of Utah.

The Court further finds

that the Petitioner has not proved that she is unable to work.
( C) The Court finds the Petitioner's current
yearly income from her private insurance disability to be $17,652
per year, wLthout consideration of any additional income she may
derive from her dogs, the sale of puppies, or other ventures that
she was engaged in during the marriage.
(D) The Court finds that the Petitioner's net
yearly net income is almost equal to the respondent's 2007 income
of $19,321.
(E) The Court finds that any shortfall in earnings
as a comparison between the Respondent's earnings and
Petitioner's earnings can clearly be compensated to Petitioner by
her ability to become employed.
(F) The Court specifically finds that the
Petitioner is underemployed

by at least the difference between

the Respondent's gross monthly income and the Petitioner's gross
monthly income.
(G) The Court finds that the Petitioner has not
proved a need for support nor an ability on the part of the
Respondent to pay alimony and therefore denies the award of any
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alimony to the Petitioner.
(H) The Court has reviewed the Petitioner's and
Respondent's average living expenses and finds those expenses to
be reasonable for each party.
Also, paragraph 10, in pertinent part, states:
(B) The Court finds that the Respondent during the
pendency of this matter was forced to acquire a second job to
assist in the payment of the alimony that was awarded to
Petitioner under the temporary order.
( C) The Court finds that the Respondent does not
have the ability to contribute support to the Petitioner in the
form of alimony.
(D) The Court finds that the Respondent does not
have a need for alimony from the Petitioner nor has he proved an
ability for Petitioner to pay him alimony.
(E) The Court denies the award of any alimony to
either the Petitioner or the Respondent.
(F) The Court has reviewed the Respondent's
average living expenses and finds those expenses to be
reasonable.
Findings cited above were referenced in each of the sections
of argument in Wife's brief, although not specifically set forth
as "marshaling".

They were set forth in the Statement of Facts

in great detail as citations to the record, i.e., "never sought
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employment with any company or employer who would use business
degree", T.T. at 20:1-10; "worked as supervisor of security
guards for Davis Security", 28-30 hours per week, in 1991-1992,
T.T. at 20-11-21, "had broker's license" T.T. at 9:11-13;
"occupation in terms of time and income generated was owner and
operation rental properties"; etc., on page 11 of Wife's brief,
which refer to paragraph 9(G) and 10 ( C ) . Also, Page 18 of
Wife's brief, "he had amassed an approximate gross worth of over
one million dollars (adding the appraisals of all of the
properties without deductions for mortgages)"(appraisals attached
as Respondent's Trial Exhibits 1, 2, 3, 4 and 7 ) ; that "he had a
broker's license", "worked as supervisor of security guards",
"worked for the recreation department" and "his employment had
been almost uniformly, throughout the marriage, that of managing
his properties" (page 19, Brief).

In addition, "..by far your

primary operation, both in terms of your time and terms of the
income it generated, was your occupation as an owner and operator
of rental property? " "Yes" (page 19, Brief, also, T.T. 186:2325; 187:1). And, that Mrs. Soderborg was gainfully employed until
stricken with bone cancer, that she was medically disabled,
"determined by her insurance carrier to be permanently and
totally disabled, correct?" Yes" (page 19, Brief, T.T. 182:9,10).
It is clear the necessity of marshaling the evidence was
satisfied as to the issue of alimony.
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2. Attorney's Fees.

Paragraph 13 of the Findings states:

13. The Court finds that each party has incurred
attorney fees and that each party should assume and pay their own
attorney fees and costs. The Court finds that neither Petitioner
nor Respondent has the ability to pay one another's attorney
fees. The Court further finds that the Petitioner has an
outstanding attorney's lien to former counsel Richard S. Nemelka
and that said obligation should be assumed and paid by Petitioner
and she should hold Respondent harmless therefrom.
The marshaling of the evidence relating to attorney's fees
began in Wife's brief with an identification of the preservation
in the trial court portion of the brief where the issue is
referenced at 144:22 ("Do you want and have any obligation here
for-in your opinion, to pay those attorney fees"); 225:6 ("Have
you been forced to incur attorney's fees in this case?"); 228:14
("Is it a request that you be awarded a portion of your
attorney's fees?"), 229:3 (""That's it, and an affidavit of
attorney's fees, your Honor"); 269:14 ("Ma'am, do you know of any
cash or savings accounts that are available by Mr. - or owned by
Mr. Soderborg that would be able to pay for your attorney's
fees?"); 276:10, 11, 12, 14 ("You have requested an award of
attorney's fees in this case.

Is it your request that the

attorney's fees, and the source of the attorney's fees be some
allocation of the property that's available in this case?

In

other words, that there be a property offset for some of your
attorney's fees?"); 277:3 ("...and actually, your Honor, I
suppose, technically I have to say with the exception of a
proffer of attorney's fees, the petitioner in this case would
8

rest.

Will the Court permit me to proffer at a subsequent

time?"); 284:18 ("My client ought to be awarded some attorney's
fees for this trial today, because Mr. Soderborg's position has
frankly been unreasonable.

For example, that he bought into her

house, but she didn't ever, through all of this lash up, acquire
any interest in his properties"); 289:22, 23, 24, 25 ("Attorney
fees.

Where is he going to find monies to pay attorney

fees....they both have need.

Neither one of them have ability to

pay...").
Attorney's fees are also set forth in Wife's brief on page
22, where it states, "The Findings of Fact relating to attorney's
fees, cited at R. 434-455, specifically paragraph 9, is rife with
err".
Page 22 continues with the allusion to Wife's inability to
be employed by being medically incapacitated as follows: "her
doctor won't release me", "there are spots there, but we haven't
actively done anything", "right now there is a spot in my
shoulder", "and, then, after that she was determined by her
disability insurance carrier to be permanently and totally
disabled, correct?" "Yes" (T.T. at 182-7-10).
As with the issue of the Findings relating to alimony, the
requirement to marshal the evidence as to the issue of attorney's
fees has been satisfied.
3.

Finding Certain Property to be Non-Marital.
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The balance

of the Findings, which include paragraphs 4 (A), (B) ,
(C),(D),(E),(F),(G), 5 (A), (B), ( C) , (D), (E) , (F) , (G) , (H) ,
(I), 6 (A), (B), (D), (E), (F) (G), (H) , (I), (J), (K) , (L) , (M) ,
(N), (0), (P), (Q), ( R ) , 7 (A), (B) and ( C ) , relate to the real
property of the parties.
The Findings, along with the trial exhibits by both the Wife
and Husband, together with the argument which cites to the
record, on pages 23 through 35, inclusive, of the Wife's brief,
and the preservation of the trial record with the extensive
record citations, on pages 9 and 10 also of the Wife's brief,
amass the exhaustive marshaling of the evidence as required by
case law.
The record is replete with "marshaling" of the evidence to
such a degree that, although perhaps not as a "magnificent array
of supporting evidence" as contemplated by the West Valley City
v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Ut Ct App 1991) cited
in Kimball v. Kimball, 2009 UT App 233 at paragraph 21;
nevertheless, it was thorough, fastidious and comprehensive and
as such meets the standard set forth in the above cases.
ARGUMENT II
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAILING TO AWARD
PETITIONER ALIMONY
RESPONSE
The Wife responds to Husband's argument that the trial court
did not err in failing to award petitioner alimony, as follows.

10

Husband argues that Wife raises three arguments, i.e., 1)
the mere fact that she is on disability is sufficient proof for
the court to conclude that she cannot sustain some type of
employment to provide for at least some of her own financial
need; 2) Husband was "chronically underemployed" for the entirety
of the parties eighteen (18) year marriage, and income should be
imputed to him on that basis, and 3) now on appeal, Wife argues
that the court should disallow certain deductions taken by
Husband on his tax returns, and that after adding in these
deductions, Husband's income is really $50,000 to $52,000.
Husband misstates Wife's arguments, and they will be
addressed in turn.
1.

The mere fact that she is on disability is sufficient

proof for the court to conclude that she cannot sustain some type
of employment to provide for at least some of her own financial
need.
The fact is, indeed, that Wife is on disability.

The

undisputed fact is that this is not a "mere" fact but substantial
in nature and longevity.

she is on not partial disability, but

whole disability. Even Husband, in his testimony acknowledges the
disability, as indicated in the following exchange:
Question: Did she remain employed at Utah Power and Light
throughout the duration of your marriage until she was placed on
disability in the mid 1990rs?
Husband: Yes
Question: And Barbara, your former wife, was diagnosed with
Cancer in approximately march of 1996, correct?
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Husband: Yes.
Question: And after treatment for that cancer, she was then
diagnosed again with cancer in her right hip in 1997, correct?
Husband: Yes.
Question: And as a result of the cancer diagnosis and as a
result of the treatment for that, she was placed on disability in
1996, true?
Husband: Yes.
Question: Okay, and then Barbara has not worked outside of
the home since she was placed on disability in 1996, correct?
Husband: Yes.
(Trial Transcript page 7:22-25, 8:1-10;20-22).
This is further driven home by Wife's testimony:
Question: We've heard testimony today that you were
diagnosed with cancer in 1996: is that correct?
Wife: Correct.
Question: And that the cancer recurred in - or let me ask
you this. Did the cancer recur?
Wife: Yes, it did.
Question: And did it recur in the form of bone cancer?
Wife: Sure, sure.
Wife: When you have breast cancer, if it comes to any other
part of your body, it's still considered breast cancer. It has
just gone to a different part of the body. So it was breast
cancer that went into the bones.
Question: Okay, but it had - maybe a better way to say it,
then, would be that it had gone into the bone?
Wife: Metastasized into the bones.
Question: And did you receive treatment for that
metastasized cancer?
Wife: Yes, I did. I was put on different medications, and I
had radiation.
Question: Did - over what course of - period of time did you
have treatment for the cancer the first time it appeared?
Wife: I was diagnosed in March or April.
Question: Of '96?
Wife: Of x 96. At which time they found out it was a very
aggressive cancer. At the time of surgery it was a small tumor,
but it had already spread throughout my body; 14 out of 16 lymp
nodes was involved in cancer, which at the time - the protocol at
that time was to do a stem cell rescue, which is similar to a
bone marrow transplant using my own marrow. So I had to do
numerous tests to see where it was, and make sure that my heart
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could handle this, and everything.
Then at that time I was into the hospital where I had to
stay for 30 days. What they did was they gave me four different
chemos for four or five days, taking my blood cells down to
absolute zero. There's a high time during that time if you were
to get a cold or anything that you would die, because you have no
immune system. So my white cells were down to zero.
Then they were infused back into me where they would climb
up. I was told at the time that we are hitting this cancer with
everything possible, because it was such an aggressive cancer;
and that if it were to come back in that first year, I would
probably di€>, because we had hit it with everything that we had.
It was - nine months later it was in my hips, my femur bones and
my pelvic.
Question: As a result of that course of treatment did you
have any side effects, and did you suffer any disabilities?
Wife: I did. Fatigue was probably the number one thing. I
have pain still in my hip and shoulder that was radiated. The
bones, I don't know if they - I'm not a doctor; but the bones
have been damaged. So I have constant pain.
Question: And now there's been some talk about you being
able to do things, like sit up at a computer or deal with a dog
or ...
Wife: Right.
Question: - that kind of thing. I mean, clearly, as you are
sitting here now, you are not a vegetable.
Wife: No, I'm not an invalid, I'm not a vegetable. I may
suffer later with the pain, but I'm able to do things.
Question: When you say you may suffer later with the pain,
you mean sitting here in Court all day in one chair, you may pay
a price for that later?
Wife: E will probably have a hard time hurting tonight,
sleeping.
Question: Okay. Have there been times, for example, are you
on medication?
Wife: Yes, I am.
Question: And have you had any side effects from the
medications that you take?
Wife: Yes, I have. Also from the chemos that I was given,
it is - in all of the surveys, tests - I'm sorry, I can't think
of the word right now, but in all that they did, there are all
these side effects, which include recurrence of cancer, which
includes arthritis, which now I have. There's a host of other
problems that will happen by giving a person chemo.
Question: Okay, and is it that host of problems and sort of
this whole fallout from the situation that's left you with the
disability rating and benefit that you have?
Wife: Yes.
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(Trial Transcript page 192:11-25, 193:1-25, 194:1-25, 195:114.
This, of course, is referenced in page 19 of Wife's brief
but now, as rebuttal, is further fleshed out with the actual
testimony.
Page 19 also references Trial Transcript 182:9, 10,
testimony of Husband, which states,
Question: Okay, and then after that, she was determined by
her disability insurance carrier to be permanently and totally
disabled, correct?
Husband: Yes
It should be suggested that "mere", particularly in the
light of "permanently and totally disabled" has a much more far
reaching connotation than that it is transitory or almost an
afterthought.
However, the "mere" fact that she is on disability is not
the only reason, although probably a justification in itself, for
alimony on an 18 and one-half year marriage as will be seen
below.
(2) Husband is chronically underemployed.

The evidence at

trial was clear that husband "never sought employment with any
company or employer who would use his business degree", [which
was undisputed he secured during the marriage to Wife)", that he
"worked as supervisor of security guards for Davis Security, 2830 hours per week, in 1991-1992", "he had a broker's license",
but "even his apartments only generated between 15-20 hours per
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week", all citations on pages 11 and top of page 12 of Wife's
Brief. The Court can take judicial notice that 40 hours per is
commonly considered full time employment.

Fifteen to twenty

hours per week, and even twenty eight to thirty hours per week,
are woefully inadequate.
Husband was not full time employed during any time of the 18
and one-half year marriage.

He secured a "second" job when

ordered to pay alimony in the amount of $514 per month at a
hearing during the divorce proceedings.

Two obvious points

emerge.
First, if Husband was not full time employed then he ought
to become full time employed, and thus has a unused potential
financial stream from which to draw for purposes of alimony.
This was not considered by the lower Court.

At the very least,

income should have been imputed since he was not full time
employed.
Second, and this is not the "law of the case" because it was
in the way of a temporary order for alimony, but the $514
previously ordered was provided monthly by the Husband until
trial.
Further, there are other considerations as to excess income.
For example, the evidence at trial and alluded to by the
Husband on page 12 of his Brief, Husband contributed an average
per month of $406 to $750 to household expenses from July, 1988
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to November, 1994.

After November, 1994, Husband paid the

mortgage payment in full and all utilities every month until the
separation of the parties in April, 2006, and he was contributing
to other household expenses as well (although Husband references
Exhibit 6 this is in error as Respondent's Exhibit 6 is History
of Purchase of Property and Zoning Problems at 157 South 800
East; however, TT 87-88 is accurate and also see T.T. at 208).
The mortgage for the Wife and the utilities, according to
Wife's Financial Statement (Respondent's Exhibit 18), which
totaled $1,144.66 for the mortgage and $73 for electricity, $86
natural gas, and $41 for water, sewer and garbage, for a total of
$1,344.66, also were not considered by the Court with respect to
available "freed up" money from which to draw alimony.
She receives $1,470.80 per month gross income from her
disability insurer, which, deducting health insurance of $70.16,
leaves a net income of $1,401.64.

According to Finding of Fact

paragraph 9(H), "The Court has reviewed the Petitioner's and
Respondent's average living expenses and finds those expenses to
be reasonable for each party.".

Those living expenses are set

forth in Respondent's Trial Exhibit 18, and Wife's monthly
expenses are $3,243.66.

Husband's monthly expenses, as set out

in Respondent's Trial Exhibit 12, are $3,093.73. With expenses
that the court has found reasonable, Wife has a substantial need
for alimony since she has a monthly shortfall of $1,842.02 per
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month ($3,243.66 less $1,401.64 = $1,842.02).
Other facts lending support to an award of alimony are that
Husband has a history of borrowing from Wife and repays what he
borrows, from his own separate cache.

He contracted with Wife to

buy into her home on Colene Drive, for $20,000, and paid the
amount off (T.T. 34;l-5, 14-23,35:6-21, Respondent's Trial
Exhibit 4 shows pay-off of $5,000 on December 29, 1989 and $4,500
on January 21, 1990 with $500 cash).

Husband borrowed another

$6,000 from Wife to purchase a Corvette, and paid this amount off
as well, "within six months" (T.T. 278:1, but see 277:24-25, and
278:2-8).

Both are substantial amounts and indicate Husband has

no problem paying for items he wants.
Although the Husband has additional expenses incurred with
his separation from Wife, he has acknowledged he uses his
apartments for his office (T.T. 44:20-21); he can use his
apartments for his residence, as well.

At trial, Husband

indicated that all the units are full except one (T.T. 54:5).
Husband's expenses, then, lend themselves to being minimized so
as to allow a reasonable alimony.
(3).

Husband has the ability to pay alimony to Wife from

the excessive expenses claimed in operation and managing the
properties. Husband had questionable purchases which he claimed
as expenses, as reflected in his purchase of a ping pong table
and treadmill, addressed in pages 182 through 187 of the Trial
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Transcript.

Further, in the profit and loss from his business,

in the third page of Tab E of the Trial Exhibit Book (referenced
at page 173 of the Trial Transcript, lines 12 through 25, and
page 174, lines 1-4) in which Husband acknowledged that his gross
receipts from his business were $49,851, yet in his summary of
his 2005 income, his income was listed at $82,000, a $24,000
discrepancy.

In addition, in response to the trial attorney's

inquiry that "one of the concerns that she [Wife} expressed on
more than one occasion was that she was afraid because you were
under-reporting your income - afraid of the legal implications of
that, correct?" "She was nervous about it, but that's not why we
didn't file jointly" (T.T. 174:25, 175:1-5).
Husband has reported spurious claims as expenses and under
reports his income (note that the under reporting was not
categorically denied; indeed, there is no denial at all but an
acceptance).

Twenty-four Thousand Dollars in a year is Two

Thousand Dollars a month apparently available for both alimony
and attorney fee considerations.
In sum, Husband is a chronically underemployed and
essentially a dead-beat Husband as far as his financial attention
to Wife is concerned.

He did not use the college degree he

obtained during his marriage to Wife to any marital benefit; he
didn't utilize any of his labor for purposes of enhancing any
property other than his own property, the entirety of which he
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acquired during the marriage; he didn't work any real job, except
on rare occasion, as a security guard, tennis pro, or real estate
broker, and even this employment only resulted in a part time
effort of 28-30 hours per week; and his attention to his
apartment upkeep was also remarkably work free using only fifteen
to twenty hours per week.
On the other hand, Wife is disabled.

It is curious that

Husband makes an issue of Wife being able to work, even at doing
occasional buys at Deseret Industries and reselling at garage
sales, as well as selling a few dogs a year, yet no physical
proof was provided to the Court in the way of a vocational expert
to show Wife was capable of working, even in this limited
capacity.

The only evidence produced at trial was the testimony

of the parties and Wife indicated she could not work, and was
receiving a whole person disability check from an insurance
company.

In the light of current events, it is well settled

insurance companies don't pay if the need doesn't exist.

Yes,

they have continued to pay and there was no evidence indicating
that the disability payments would be discontinued.
Wife has a need for alimony, Husband has the ability.
is a long term marriage.

This

Husband should have been ordered to pay

alimony and for a statutory period of the life of the marriage.
ARGUMENT III
THE LABOR OF A SPOUSE ON HIS OWN SEPARATE AND
INHERITED PROPERTY DOES NOT TRANSFORM THAT
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PROPERTY INTO JOINT PROPERTY
RESPONSE
Husband and Wife were married for over eighteen years.
Husband secures separate property during the course of the
marriage (primarily from inheritance), and devotes his full time
efforts (which amounted to part time for anyone else, including
his Wife who, for the first eight years of the marriage worked
the typical forty hour week for Utah Power and Light),
contributes some mortgage payments and utility payments for
awhile, buys and sells classic cars (twelve during the marriage,
mostly Corvettes) with the money he makes on managing the
properties he has acquired (although did borrow $6,000 from Wife
early in the marriage and paid it back within six months), and
walks away from the marriage with the entirety of the property he
acquired and developed through his sole efforts.

He also walks

away with one half of Wife's retirement, and didn't earn any
retirement of his own, from which Wife could draw, because his
entire efforts were not employment for anyone but himself on his
properties.

In the meantime, Wife contracts cancer, which was

extremely aggressive, resulting in a thirty day stay in the
hospital, numerous chemotherapy treatments, has recurrent pain
which doesn't go away, and a determination by the insurance
company of a whole person disability ("...she was determined by
her disability insurance carrier to be permanently and totally
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disabled, correct?", "Yes", from Husband's testimony at T.T
182:7-10). "I have a really hard time sleeping because I'm in
pain all the time", Wife complains (T.T. 273:16-17). Wife
receives no alimony payments, even with the disability, because
Wife can equalize the income from her disability with purchases
she makes from Deseret Industries and then re-selling these at a
garage sale, and she also has an income from selling Shelty dogs,
which, according to trial transcripts, had a value of, for seven
dogs, $4,500 for the time in which she was separated from
Husband, a period of about two years.

The lower Court adds that

figure into the property distribution, despite Wife's testimony
at trial that she doesn't make any money off these dogs (because
of the cost in raising them ("..by the time you get the money for
all these puppies and you turn around the buy the food, buy the
vaccinations, everything else with these dogs, there's not much
left over", T.T. 197:10-13).

She does have a nice computer room

in which she spends six hours a day, according to Husband who has
not spent any time in the house two years prior to trial, nor did
he ever spend six hours at home during the day, since he was
"managing" his own properties.
Husband enters the marriage with zero assets, but because of
his inheritance, he ends up owning a number of properties.

The

properties, when acquired, were dilapidated, virtually unrentable and were facing numerous zoning and building violations.
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Nonetheless Husband, because of his focus and attention on these
properties, brought them into compliance and now the properties
"never had so few vacancies'' (T.T. 126:5).

Husband, age 54 with

no physical disabilities (T.T. 52:25, 53:1-3) was, at a hearing
on temporary orders, ordered to pay $514 in alimony.

This was

discontinued by the trial court.
Is there something wrong with this picture?
Contrary to Husband's argument in his Brief, case law does
support Wife's position regarding separate property.
Husband relies on the Dunn case for the proposition that
"The general rule is that equity requires that each party retain
the separate property he or she brought into the marriage,
including any appreciation of the separate property". Dunn v.
Dunn,802 P.2d 1314 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).

However, the next

sentence, which was included in Husband's Brief reference, is
monumental.

"Exceptions to this include whether the property has

been commingled, whether the other party has by his or her
efforts augmented, maintained or protected the separate property,

and whether the distribution
result".

achieves

a fair,

just

and

equitable

Id. (Italics mine).
Is it a fair, just and equitable result when Husband,

throughout a period exceeding eighteen years, uses his labor,
toward the betterment of the properties he acquired "and that's
the biggest resource that has existed in this marriage, and that
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is an asset to which my client is entitled.

His labor is the

marital asset that's gone to improve these properties, to
maintain th€>m, to preserve them, to improve them over time/'
(T.T. 280:15-17).
Courts, as in the Dunn case, have recognized that invading
separate property is a necessary exception to the general rule,
to achieve a fair, just and equitable result.

And "even in cases

when the inherited property has not lost its identity as such,
the court may nevertheless award it to the non-heir spouse in
lieu of alimony and in other extraordinary situations when equity
so demands". Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166, 1169 (Utah Ct. App.
1990). In Savage v. Savage, 658 P.2d 1201, 1204 (Utah 1983), the
Utah Supreme Court noted that the trial court's property
distribution - granting the wife forty percent of the value of
the husband's company - was within its allotted discretion, in
part, "while it is true that the [wife] took no responsibility
for the business, it was her assumption of the domestic burdens
which made possible the [husband's] full-time participation in
the business", (cited in Jensen v. Jensen, 2009 UT App. 1, 1024) .
A spouse's separate property, particularly incomeproducing property, could be considered in determining alimony or
child support, "or utilized in other extraordinary situations
where equity so demands". Mortensen v. Mortensen, 7 60 P.2d 304,
(Utah 1988). Premarital property, gifts, and inheritances may be
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viewed as separate property, and, in appropriate circumstances,
equity will require that each party retain the separate property
brought to the marriage.

However, the rule is not invariable.

In fashioning an equitable property division, trial courts need
consider all of the pertinent circumstances. Burke v. Burke, 733
P.2d 133 (Utah 1987)(cited in Bailey v. Bailey, 745 P.2d 830,
833. (

) ...the trial court did not abuse its discretion by

finding all appreciation in equity while the parties lived in the
Home to be marital property.

See Schaumberg v. Schaumberq, 875

P.2d 598, 603 (also cited in Mackey v. Mackey, 2002 UT APP 349.
This court has also reviewed, in some depth, in the Jensen
case previously cited, a background of separate property cases.
Included in these are references to Kunzler v. Kunzler, 2008 UT
App 263, which provides a summary of contribution cases, and held
that the wife was entitled to part of her husband' s separate
business property because, although "she was not his partner in
the business [at issue] she was his partner in the business of
marriage", (fn 5 ) , Id., 1 10 n. 5; Jensen v. Jensen, 203 P. 3d
1020, at 1025, 1 12.
It can be concluded from the cases above that, although as a
general rule, separate property should remain separate property,
there are exceptions to this rule based on equitable principles.
The following are considerations that require an application
of equity, which are not inclusive:
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1.

The parties were married over 18 years.

2.

Wife is permanently and wholly disabled.

3.

Wife's retirement, to which she solely contributed to,

was divided so that Husband, who had not contributed, would
receive an equal one-half share.
4.

Although wife is permanently and wholly disabled,

Husband is in perfect health.
5.

Husband, during the entirely of the 18 year marriage,

essentially built his own retirement, from which Wife could not
participate, but focusing his energies and labors on enhancing
his separate property.
6.

Husband does not have to pay alimony, although he had

paid alimony in the amount of $514 in accordance with a prior
order of the Court, and made these payments consistently.
7.

Wife has a need for alimony, and has a shortfall every

month as reflected in her trial exhibit Financial Declaration.
8.

Husband has the ability to pay alimony as indicated by

his prior payments, and his paying, in the past, the mortgage,
the utilities, repayment of $6,000 he borrowed from Wife, payment
of $20,000 to buy into Wife's residence, and his under reporting
of income and questionable expense claims.
9.

Husband has income properties from which to draw income,

which were acquired during his marriage (although by
inheritance); Wife has no income properties.
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awarded one-half.
This court should right the ship.
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